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Barriers to Criminal Enforcement
Against Counterfeiting in China
Daniel C.K. Chow*
ABSTRACT
Multinational companies (MNCs) with valuable trademarks in
China seek criminal enforcement against counterfeiting because other
available avenues of relief, such as administrative and judicial
remedies, have proven to be ineffective. While MNCs prefer enforcement
through China’s Police, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), many MNCs
are unaware of the significant hidden dangers of using the PSB.
Most MNCs will delegate enforcement of trademark rights to
their Chinese subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are known to make
illegal payments to the PSB that may violate the laws of the PRC as
well as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). These
acts expose MNCs to draconian penalties under PRC law and the
FCPA. MNCs can be unaware of these illegal practices because many
MNCs organize their business structures and intellectual property (IP)
management strategies in ways that shield MNCs from reviewing some
of the on-the-ground actions by their Chinese subsidiaries. This Article
exposes these risks, explains how some of these risks arise, and makes
suggestions on how MNCs can structure their business organizations
and IP management structures in China to eliminate or mitigate these
risks.

*
BA, JD, Yale University. Bazler Chair in Law, the Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law. The author lived and worked in China as in-house counsel for a
multinational company and has first-hand experience with the issues discussed in this Article.
The author also recently served as an expert witness in a litigation involving use of the Public
Security Bureau in an enforcement action against counterfeiting. My experience in China, my
work as an expert witness, and my continuing contacts with academics and lawyers in China
form the bases for many of the opinions in this Article. Thanks to Natasha Landon, Moritz
Reference Librarian, and Luting Chen, Moritz 3L, for their research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although multinational companies (MNCs) have engaged in
two decades of intensive efforts in enforcement and lobbying in the
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), counterfeiting of
trademarked goods continues to be pervasive in China and a global
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problem.1 According to a recent study, China produces 80 percent of
the world’s counterfeits, and global counterfeiting is now a $1.7 trillion
per year industry, expected to grow to $2.8 trillion in 2022.2
Counterfeiting is now considered the largest criminal enterprise in the
world, and China is its epicenter.3 The recent explosion of sales of
counterfeits from China on the worldwide internet has created new
challenges for MNCs and other brand owners in the new millennium
in protecting their intellectual property (IP) rights.4
MNCs that own trademarks in China have several avenues of
relief available against counterfeiters, including administrative,
judicial, and criminal remedies.5 Many MNCs find, however, that
1.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3 (2000)
[hereinafter Counterfeiting in China]. Counterfeiting in China as a major business problem for
MNCs first gained international attention at the beginning of the new millennium. Id. at 6–7.
The controversy over counterfeiting arose when China was beginning its ascent to becoming one
of the most powerful economies in the world. Id. at 7–8. It still rages on now that China and the
United States have become almost equal competitors for the position of the world’s top economic
power. See id. at 13–14. For a general discussion of the US-China competition, see Daniel C.K.
Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1296 (2016).
2.
See Wade Shepard, Meet the Man Fighting America’s Trade War Against Chinese
Counterfeits
(It’s
Not
Trump),
FORBES
(Mar.
29,
2018,
3:52
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2018/03/29/meet-the-man-fighting-americas-tradewar-against-chinese-counterfeits/?sh=7ba454a41c0d [https://perma.cc/SZ29-STQA].
3.
See id. (“The trade in counterfeit and pirated goods is currently a $1.7 trillion per
year industry . . . and is expected to grow to $2.8 trillion and cost 5.4 million jobs by 2022.”). The
US General Accountability Office reports that in 2016, 88 percent of all counterfeit goods seized
by the United States originated from China and Hong Kong. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-18-216, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS
RISKS
POSED
BY
CHANGING
COUNTERFEITS
MARKET
13
(2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf [https://perma.cc/28H7-CE46]. The European Union
claims that China is the largest source of counterfeits that enter the European Union. Report on
the EU Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, at 6 (2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/system/files/2019-09/2019-ipr-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HGB-XLVN].
4.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the
Internet, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 157, 161 (2020) [hereinafter Alibaba, Amazon, and
Counterfeiting]. According to Xihua, China’s official press agency, more than 40 percent of all
goods sold online in China are counterfeit or of bad quality. See Reuters, More Than 40 Per Cent
of China’s Online Sales ‘Counterfeits or Bad Quality’, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 3, 2015, 1:01 AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11971401/More-than-40-per-cent-ofChinas-online-sales-counterfeit-or-bad-quality.html [https://perma.cc/HQ33-WUF6]. Xinhua does
not distinguish between counterfeits and products of poor quality; it is unclear whether Xinhua
believes that these are two separate categories of goods or a single category as most counterfeits
are of poor quality. See id.
5.
Administrative authorities and courts have jurisdiction over counterfeiting cases
under Chinese trademark law. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shang Biao Fa (中华人民共和国商
标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 23, 2019, effective Nov. 1, 2019) arts. 60–61, 2019 China Law LEXIS
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administrative and judicial remedies are unsatisfactory.6 While
administrative enforcement remains the most popular option, it
results in few criminal prosecutions and fines that are so low as to
create no deterrence.7 Counterfeiters subject to administrative
enforcement are able to recommence counterfeiting operations in
weeks, or even days, after the administrative action has been
completed.8 Courts have also proven to be an ineffective avenue of
relief against counterfeiters who simply disappear at the first sign of
trouble and never appear in court.9
Due to the deficiencies of administrative and judicial avenues
of relief, MNC brand owners have sought to use criminal enforcement
through the PRC Public Security Bureau (PSB), China’s primary
police force, as a weapon against counterfeiting.10 The PSB is one of
China’s most powerful and feared entities.11 The PSB has the broad
discretion to detain persons suspected of crimes, and such decisions
are not subject to judicial review or oversight by higher-level
authorities.12 Additionally, the PSB can hold suspects in custody
under harsh conditions for many months without ever charging them
with a crime.13 These unchecked powers alone are sufficient to create
fear in China. Furthermore, persons who are convicted of
counterfeiting crimes face years in prison.14
MNCs may prefer criminal enforcement, but there are hidden
dangers in using the PSB that appear to be unknown to many
445 [hereinafter PRC Trademark Law]. The judicial authorities have jurisdiction to prosecute
criminal counterfeiting cases under Chinese criminal law. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing
Fa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective Nov. 4, 2017) art. 140, 2017 China
Law LEXIS 1583 [hereinafter PRC Criminal Law]. For a further discussion, see infra Section
II.B.
6.
See infra Section II.B.
7.
See infra Section II.B.
8.
See infra Section II.B; See Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of
Multinational Companies in China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41
GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 750–60 (2010) [hereinafter Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies].
9.
See id. at 758–59
10.
See id. at 758.
11.
See infra Section II.B.3.
12.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法)
[Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018) art. 82, 2018 China Law
LEXIS 761 [hereinafter PRC Criminal Procedure Law]. The PSB can detain persons based on its
assessment that the person is suspected of a crime. See id. The PRC Criminal Procedure Law
does not contain any mechanism for review of the PSB’s decision to detain. See id.
13.
See id. art. 156.
14.
See PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 214, 216 (setting forth terms of imprisonment for counterfeiting crimes).
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US-based MNCs. These risks can lead to serious consequences and, in
some cases, even threaten the continuing viability of the MNC.15 Some
MNCs lack knowledge of these practices due to their organizational
structure and how they manage their IP rights in China, as further
explained below.16
Under PRC law, MNCs are required to establish a separate
legal entity to serve as their subsidiary in China.17 At its inception,
the subsidiary is an empty vessel that must acquire capital assets and
IP rights. The MNC injects capital, usually in the form of cash, to the
subsidiary. One approach to allow the subsidiary to acquire IP rights
is for the MNC to register all trademarks in China and then license
those rights to the Chinese subsidiary.18 A second approach is for the
MNC to allow the Chinese subsidiary to register the trademarks in its
own name.19 The reasoning for this latter approach is that it is less
complex and involves fewer costs; because the MNC owns the Chinese
subsidiary, the MNC also owns the trademark in China.20 If the
MNC’s trademark is registered under the name of the subsidiary,
however, then only the subsidiary has the legal standing to bring an
enforcement action with the PRC authorities.21 The PSB and other
PRC authorities will demand to see the trademark certificate in the
name of the petitioner before the authorities will initiate an
enforcement action.22 When the trademark is registered in the name of
the MNC’s Chinese subsidiary, the MNC has no legal standing and
becomes unable to control or influence the course of the enforcement
action.23 This structure will lead some Chinese subsidiaries to engage
in dubious activities, such as making illegal payments to the PSB in
exchange for an enforcement action that would otherwise be
unavailable.24 The Chinese subsidiary obtains criminal enforcement,

15.
See infra Part III.
16.
See infra Section II.A–B.
17.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Fa (中华人民共和国外商投资法)
[Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020) art. 2, 2019 China Law LEXIS
1665 [hereinafter PRC Foreign Investment Law].
18.
See id. art. 30.
19.
See id.
20.
See id.
21.
See PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 60.
22.
See id. art. 62.
23.
See id. art. 60.
24.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why Multinational Companies Doing Business in China Fall
into the Trap of Making Payments to China’s Police, 16 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 1, 8 (2016)
[hereinafter Payments to China’s Police].

638

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:633

and the subsidiary never informs the MNC about the details of the
enforcement action.25
Payments to the PSB or other enforcement authorities in
China lead to serious risks under the PRC legal and political system.26
While payments are tolerated by PRC authorities, they are of dubious
legality; there is always the possibility of a crackdown that will expose
this practice and lead to embarrassment, as well as criminal liability,
for the MNC and its officers.27 Illegal payments also further entrench
and perpetuate a business culture of corruption in China, which is
detrimental to the long-term interests of MNCs and to the
development of the rule of law in the country.28 Payments to the PSB
also create unseemly entanglements for the MNC’s Chinese subsidiary
as the PSB will seek to further exploit the subsidiary through
continuing demands for additional payments.29
An additional and perhaps even more significant risk is the
applicability of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) and other foreign anti-bribery laws like the United Kingdom
Bribery Act.30 Payments by the Chinese subsidiary to the PSB could
fall within the FCPA’s proscription against the making of illegal
payments for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in
China.31 Other provisions that relate to accurate record keeping and
internal accounting controls also apply to the actions of Chinese
subsidiaries of US-based MNCs with publicly traded securities.32
These latter provisions create independent obligations and can be
breached even if no payment was ever completed or promised.33
Penalties under the FCPA encompass severe civil and criminal
penalties, including imprisonment of corporate officers.34
To mitigate these risks under PRC law, the FCPA, and other
foreign anti-bribery laws, this Article argues that the MNC should
25.
See id.
26.
PRC Criminal Law, supra note 5, art. 389.
27.
See id.
28.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24.
29.
Id.
30.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3; Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). The UK Bribery Act
imposes more severe penalties and is broader in scope than the FCPA. See Douglas Kelly, AntiBribery Law Basics: FCPA and the UK Bribery Act, EVERFI, https://everfi.com/blog/workplacetraining/fcpa-uk-bribery-act-bribery-basics/ [https://perma.cc/K9QQ-H5SM] (Nov. 23, 2020). A
US-based MNC that has subsidiaries in the United Kingdom could be subject to both the FCPA
and the Bribery Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 12 (U.K.).
31.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
32.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B).
33.
See id.
34.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g).
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always register all important trademarks in its own name in China,
and then license the trademark to its Chinese subsidiaries.35 The
licensing agreement should also authorize the Chinese subsidiary to
enforce IP rights on behalf of the MNC. This approach will vindicate
the principle that the MNC, not its subsidiaries, owns all of the
important IP assets of the business. This approach will also allow the
MNC, as the registered trademark owner, to exercise the maximum
amount of control over the enforcement action and any conduct by its
Chinese subsidiary. With this structure in place, the MNC can strictly
control all enforcement activities and prevent the Chinese subsidiary
from engaging in dangerous behavior.
This Article will examine these risks, many of them unknown
to MNCs. Part II of this Article will present an overview of the
enforcement system for trademarks in China and explain why many
MNC brand owners seek criminal enforcement. Part II also explains
the common approaches used by MNCs to register their trademarks
and how some approaches create greater risks that a Chinese
subsidiary will engage in illegal actions, such as making illegal
payments to PRC authorities. Part III contains a detailed discussion of
the FCPA issues that arise as a result of these practices. Part IV then
proposes a number of suggested planning and preventative measures
that MNCs should undertake to eliminate or limit these dubious
practices. Finally, Part IV discusses alternative approaches to
registering trademarks in China that should lessen the risks that the
MNC’s Chinese subsidiaries will engage in illegal actions during the
course of protecting and enforcing trademarks. This approach requires
the MNC to register the trademark in its own name and then license
the trademark to its subsidiaries or affiliate entities in China.

35.
This is a basic principle of IP law that the author has advocated in all contexts. See,
e.g., DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 903 (4th ed. 2020) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY].
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II. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AGAINST COUNTERFEITING IN CHINA
A. MNC Brand Owners, Trademark Registration, and Enforcement in
China
The entry of foreign brands and trademarks into China’s
internal market in the past three decades has been a key driver of the
rise of China’s consumer economy and its burgeoning middle class.36
For example, MNCs such as Procter & Gamble, McDonald’s, and
Coca-Cola have introduced their brands for daily-use products—
hygiene products, fast food, and soft drinks—into China with great
success.37 Many consumers in China are attracted to the allure,
prestige, and glamour of foreign brands.38 In turn, MNC brand owners
are eager to capitalize on this strong appetite of Chinese consumers
for the MNCs’ products by producing and selling them in China.39
However, before brand owners enter the Chinese market, they must
take steps to protect their IP assets.
MNCs based in the United States (i.e., with US headquarters)
that have valuable trademarks or brands that they wish to
manufacture and then sell in China must first register their
trademarks in China.40 Unregistered trademarks receive no protection
in China.41 Many US-based MNCs have first registered their

36.
See Dominic Barton, Half a Billion: China’s Middle-Class Consumers, THE
DIPLOMAT (May 30, 2013), https://thediplomat.com/2013/05/half-a-billion-chinas-middle-classconsumers/ [https://perma.cc/G8PX-N52F]; Dominic Barton, Youngang Chen & Amy Jin, Mapping
China’s
Middle
Class,
MCKINSEY
&
C O.
(June
1,
2013),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/mapping-chinas-middle-class
[https://perma.cc/YVV2-B84S].
37.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN
A NUTSHELL 34 (3d ed. 2015).
38.
For example, it is a mark of prestige for a host to serve a famous foreign brand of
liquor, such as a French made cognac like Hennessy or a western brand of whiskey such as
Johnny Walker Black Label. See Jiani Ma, Rich Post-80s Drive Chinese Whiskey Market
Growth, JING DAILY (Apr. 16, 2018), https://jingdaily.com/chinese-whiskey-market/
[https://perma.cc/Y9DA-HLP4] (noting the demand for premium and super premium brands of
whiskey and cognac in China).
39.
See Lambert Bu, Benjamin Durand-Servoignt, Aimee Kim & Naomi Yamakawa,
Chinese Luxury Consumers: More Global, More Demanding, Still Spending, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-

insights/chinese-luxury-consumers-more-global-more-demanding-still-spending#
[https://perma.cc/373M-4JY6].
40.
See PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 3. The only exception is for well-known
trademarks, a special category. See id. art. 14.
41.
See id. arts. 3, 56.
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trademarks in the United States.42 Then, based on the success of the
US trademarked product, the MNCs attempt to expand their sales to
China.43 Due to the territorial nature of trademarks, a US trademark
registration creates no rights outside of the United States.44 Unless
the trademark is registered in China, Chinese copycats and
counterfeiters are free to make knockoffs of the trademark.45
A US-based MNC with a successful brand that it wishes to
produce and sell in China will usually register both a Chinese
language version and an English version of the US trademark with
the PRC trademark authorities.46 Both the English and Chinese
language trademarks will then appear on the product together.47 This
is the typical practice of most MNCs in China.48 For example, a can of
Coca-Cola will have the English language trademark “Coca-Cola” next
to the Chinese language trademark, 可口可乐 (Ke ko ke le, an
alliteration that means “delicious happiness”).49
Foreign companies that seek to manufacture and sell their
branded products in China are first required to establish a Chinese
business entity under local law.50 PRC law does not permit foreign
entities to do business in China directly, but only through a business
vehicle established under local law, a requirement that is typical in
many countries.51 Although China offers a number of business vehicles
for foreign investment, most foreign companies have traditionally
established either a joint venture with a local Chinese partner or a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE), which is a wholly owned
42.
See,
e.g.,
The
Coca-Cola
Company,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Coca-Cola-Company [https://perma.cc/56RV-95TS] (last
visited
Jan.
29,
2022);
McDonald’s
Trademarks, GERBEN
LAW
FIRM,
https://www.gerbenlaw.com/trademarks/food-companies/mcdonalds/
[https://perma.cc/FPC5UWG3] (Mar. 31, 2022).
43.
See Zhong Nan & Wang Zhuoqiong, MNCs Vow to Expand, Invest Further in Nation,
CHINA DAILY, http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202011/26/WS5fbf01a8a31024ad0ba9687d.html
[https://perma.cc/55KR-NGY9] (Nov. 26, 2020, 9:15 AM).
44.
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 330 (4th ed. 2021) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS].
45.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 3.
46.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous Marks
Doctrine in China, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 57, 79 (2015).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 76–77.
49.
For an image of the Coca-Cola English and Chinese trademarks side-by-side on the
product, see Cola Bottle China Script Logo, COCA-COLA, https://us.coca-cola.com/store/coca-colabottle-china-script-logo [https://perma.cc/55KR-NGY9].
50.
PRC Foreign Investment Law, supra note 17, art. 2.
51.
See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 44, at 400.
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subsidiary of the US parent company.52 The WFOE or joint venture is
a Chinese legal entity but is wholly or partly owned by a foreign
company.53
After the MNC has established a business entity in China, the
MNC must then acquire IP rights for the entity.54 The business entity
begins as an empty vessel into which the MNC must inject capital and
IP assets.55 Among the IP assets are the brands or trademarks that
will be produced and sold by its Chinese business entity.56
A crucial decision for an MNC when filing its trademark
registrations in China is which entity will be the registered owner of
the trademarks: either the US parent or the Chinese business entity
or subsidiary.57 One approach is to have the US-based MNC or the US
parent company—the owner of the US trademark—also act as the
trademark owner for the purpose of registering the marks in China.
Once the registration is obtained in the name of the US parent, it will
then license the trademarks to the Chinese subsidiary.58 The licensing
agreement is necessary because the Chinese business entity otherwise
would not have the right to use the trademark on the products that it
manufactures.59 The other approach is to allow the Chinese business
entity to register the trademark in its own name.60 If this approach is

52.
PRC Foreign Investment Law, supra note 17, art 2. The Foreign Investment Law,
effective in 2020, replaced the regime of foreign direct investment that had existed in China
since China first opened itself up to foreign investment in the late 1970s. Id.; see Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi jingying Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法) [Law of
the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2001, effective Mar. 15, 2001) 2001 China Law
LEXIS 4066 [hereinafter Equity Joint Venture Law]. Under prior law, foreign investors were
required to set up joint ventures under the Equity Joint Venture Law (2001) or wholly foreign
owned subsidiaries under the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law (2000). Equity Joint
Venture Law, supra; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Duzi Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国外商
独资企业法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2000, effective Oct. 31, 2000)
2000 China Law LEXIS 3337.
53.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 44, at 499–500.
54.
Id. at 503.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
See id., at 340, 343 (using an example of two alternatives for obtaining IP rights in
foreign markets and providing a sample licensing provision in patent licensing agreement); see
also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 35, at 903 (explaining that a parent
company should register all IP rights in its own name and then license them to the foreign subsidiary, similarly rejecting the approach of allowing the subsidiary to register IP rights of the
parent).
58.
See PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 43.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. arts. 4, 6.
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taken, then no license agreement is needed because the Chinese
subsidiary, as the registered trademark owner, has the right to use
the trademark on the goods that it produces.61 The US parent owns
the Chinese subsidiary and thus indirectly owns the trademark
registered in the subsidiary’s name.62
One other common scenario is when the Chinese business
entity uses a local trademark.63 Suppose, for example, that a joint
venture formed by the MNC and the local partner, a PRC company,
wishes to use a trademark owned by the local partner. The local
partner may permit the joint venture to use the trademark. Another
approach is for the MNC to purchase the Chinese language trademark
from the local partner,64 register the local trademark in its own
name,65 and then license it back to the joint venture.66 This latter
approach involves more costs to the MNC and reduces the profits from
the joint venture because of the initial capital expenditure for the
purchase of the trademark from the local partner.67
Registering all of an MNC’s trademarks in China under the
name of the US parent company vindicates the principle that the US
parent owns all of the business’s IP assets and prevents any questions
or disputes concerning who or which entity owns the IP assets of the
business. The disadvantage of this approach is that it involves more
costs and steps. The US parent will need to use licensing agreements
and may need to purchase local trademarks, register the trademarks
in its own name, and then license them back to the joint venture or
WFOE.
The decision concerning which entity assumes the role of the
trademark owner in registering the marks in China has important
ramifications in counterfeiting enforcement actions, discussed in
Section II.B. below.68 Under PRC law, only the registered trademark
owner can bring an enforcement action with the PRC authorities.69

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. art 3.
See id. arts. 42–43.
See id. art. 3.
Id. art. 42.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 43.
See PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 72.
See infra Section II.B.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 60.
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B. Role of Major Enforcement Authorities Against Counterfeiting in
China
China has established a legal system in which several different
entities have overlapping authority to enforce trademark rights
against counterfeiting.70 These authorities can be broadly divided into
administrative, judicial, and police organizations.71 In general, the
brand owner makes the initial choice regarding which authority to
approach.72 Although brand owners have several enforcement options,
most brand owners find that enforcement in China is ineffective due to
corruption and a lack of political will.73
1. Administrative Enforcement
Under PRC law, the State Administration of Market
Regulation (SAMR), formerly known as the State Administration of
Industry and Commerce, and its local branches (AMRs) are primarily
charged with regulating and promoting commercial activity within
China.74 The SAMR is the government entity that has responsibility
for regulating China’s markets and regulating the activities of China’s
business entities.75 All business entities must register with a local
branch of the SAMR and obtain a business license.76 No business
entity, including foreign-invested companies, can lawfully operate in
China without a business license issued by an AMR.77 As the use of
trademarks is essential to commerce in China (as in most countries),
the AMRs’ overall responsibility includes authority over the
registration and enforcement of trademarks.78

70.
See Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 8, at 754–55.
71.
See id. at 750–51.
72.
See id. at 751.
73.
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 203, 213, 218–20, 222–25 (2006).
74.
Katherine Wang, Mimi Yang & David Zhang, China’s New State Market Regulatory
Administration: What to Know and What to Expect, ROPES & GRAY (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2018/04/Chinas-New-State-Market-RegulatoryAdministration-What-to-Know-and-What-to-Expect [https://perma.cc/5TDB-5H3Z]. The SAMR
was previously known as the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC). Id. In
2018, the SAMR replaced the SAIC. Id. In the provisions cited in the text, the PRC Trademark
Law still refers to the administrations of industry and commerce (AICs), but the AICs have been
replaced by the AMRs.
75.
Id.
76.
Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting, supra note 4, at 189.
77.
Id.
78.
Wang et al., supra note 74.
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Article 2 of the PRC Trademark Law provides that the SAMR
shall establish a trademark registration system and a trademark
review and adjudication board to resolve trademark disputes dealing
with basic legal issues, such as eligibility for trademark registration
and protection.79 Article 60 of the PRC Trademark Law provides that
in the case of infringement or counterfeiting, “the trademark
registrant or an interested party shall request the relevant
administrative department for industry and commerce to address the
dispute.”80 The PRC Trademark Law sets forth the investigatory
powers of the AMRs in trademark cases in detail, including the power
to interrogate suspects and seize and review financial records.81 The
PRC Trademark Law further provides that “if the administrative
department for industry and commerce is of the opinion that the
infringement is established, it shall order the relevant party to
immediately cease the infringing acts, and shall confiscate and destroy
the infringing goods and instruments mainly used for manufacturing
the infringing goods and forging the registered trademark.”82 The
AMRs also have the power to impose fines,83 and award compensatory
damages to the trademark owner.84
The PRC Trademark Law further provides that during the
course of a trademark investigation by the AMRs, “where a crime is
suspected to have been committed, it shall promptly transfer the case
to a judicial department for handling in accordance with law.”85 Thus,
the PRC Trademark Law contemplates that the AMRs should be the
first avenue of recourse for the trademark owner in a trademark
counterfeiting and infringement case; if the AMR undercovers
criminal activity during the course of the AMR’s investigation, the
AMR shall transfer the case to the Public Security Bureau (PSB)
(considered part of the judiciary in China and further discussed below)
for criminal enforcement.86

79.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 2–3.
80.
Id. art. 60.
81.
Id. art. 62.
82.
Id. art. 60.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. art. 63.
85.
Id. art. 61.
86.
All criminal cases are initiated by the PSB. See PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra
note 12, arts. 3, 19.

646

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:633

a. Enforcement Process Through the AMRs
Although AMRs and other authorities in China have
investigatory powers, brand owners in China must usually conduct
substantial preliminary investigatory activities on their own before
approaching PRC authorities.87 AMRs and other authorities do not
have the resources or the inclination to conduct a lengthy
investigation into counterfeiting activities.88 For this reason, most
brand owners will approach the AMRs after having first identified the
counterfeiter, its operations, and its locations.89
Most counterfeiters use false identities and clandestine
operations, so finding accurate information about the counterfeiter is
difficult but essential.90 Many brand owners will hire private
investigation companies located in China or Hong Kong to conduct an
investigation of the counterfeiter.91 Although the use of private
investigation companies can be controversial in the PRC, such
companies are lawful and tolerated by the PRC authorities.92 Some
MNCs have large enough internal brand protection personnel to
conduct investigations on their own, but as this work can be
dangerous, many MNCs prefer to hire independent contractors who
87.
The burden falls on the brand owner to conduct an investigation and gather enough
evidence to convince the PRC authorities to act. This observation is based on the author’s own
experience working in China. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Cultural Barriers to Effective Enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in China, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 555 & n.39 (2017) [hereinafter Cultural Barriers].
88.
Id. at 555.
89.
Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 8, at 763–64.
90.
See id.; e.g., Jeff Bercovici, Small Businesses Say Amazon Has a Huge Counterfeiting
Problem.
This
“Shark
Tank”
Company
Is
Fighting
Back,
INC.,
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201904/jeff-bercovici/amazon-fake-copycat-knockoff-productssmall-business.html [https://perma.cc/LKN5-SGCD] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022); David Pierson,
Extra Inventory. More Sales. Lower Prices. How Counterfeits Benefit Amazon, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
28, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-amazon-counterfeits20180928-story.html [https://perma.cc/67L9-LS7X] (“[I]f Amazon shutters one store for selling
knockoffs,
the
owner
often
shifts
operations
to
another.”);
Alana
Semuels,
Amazon
May
Have
a
Counterfeit
Problem,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
20,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/amazon-may-have-a-counterfeitproblem/558482/ [https://perma.cc/9XJQ-GC4F] (“These problems come up once a week.”).
91.
ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 196–98 (2018).
92.
Private
Investigators
Debated,
CHINA.ORG.CN
(Sept.
5,
2001),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Sep/18678.htm [https://perma.cc/ZMC8-NWPS]. Private
investigation companies are controversial because they engage in what can be viewed as police
work, which is solely the province of the PRC government. Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra
note 8, at 764. Nevertheless, such companies are tolerated by the PRC authorities under the
guise of market information companies because they provide an essential service that the PRC
government has neither the resources nor the interest to provide. See id.
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specialize in this work and are willing to assume the risks.93 Private
investigation companies will sometimes infiltrate a counterfeiting ring
through the use of false identities and by placing purchase orders for
counterfeit goods, activities that most brand owners do not wish their
own employees to undertake.94 The need to use private investigation
companies adds a significant cost to brand owners, as each
investigation usually costs thousands of dollars, and many MNCs find
it necessary to conduct multiple operations simultaneously on an
annual basis.95
Once the brand owner has obtained the necessary information
on the counterfeiter, the brand owner will approach the appropriate
AMR to conduct a raid of the counterfeiter and a seizure of product,
cash, and equipment.96 The brand owner must produce a trademark
certificate registered with the SAMR to demonstrate that it is the
lawful owner of the trademark.97 PRC enforcement authorities will not
bring any enforcement action without proof that the complainant is, or
has been authorized by, the registered trademark owner.98 A
representative of the brand owner, usually with its private
investigators in tow, will appear before the AMR with a written onepage complaint and a copy of its trademark registration certificate.99
In some cases, an oral application will be sufficient if the AMR and the
brand owner have worked together in the past and have become
familiar with each other.100
Typically, within the hour, the brand owner and its private
investigators will then board a van with members of the AMR, trailed
by other vehicles.101 Typically, only then will the brand owner reveal
the location of the counterfeiter.102 Revealing the location at the last

93.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24.
94.
See id.
95.
Id. at 12. According to author’s own experience, the budgets of MNC for enforcement
can be in the millions of dollars per year. See Chow, Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 23
n.81.
96.
See Chow, Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 19–20 n. 66 (describing raids
conducted in Yiwu City, “a significant wholesale distribution center for counterfeit goods” in
China from 1998 to 1999).
97.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 60.
98.
Id.
99.
See Albert Tsui, CHINA: New Standard on Trademark Infringement, INT’L
TRADEMARK ASS’N (July. 15, 2020), https://www.inta.org/perspectives/china-new-standard-ontrademark-infringement/ [https://perma.cc/Y8YF-DQ76].
100.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 4.
101.
Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 8, at 761.
102.
Id.

648

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:633

minute is necessary to avoid tip-offs from the AMR.103 During the raid,
the brand owner’s representative will identify the product suspected to
be counterfeit and needed to be seized.104 The AMR officers depend on
the brand owner to identify the counterfeit product because these
officers are enforcement authorities and have no training in or
knowledge of trademark law or IP.105
The AMR will seize any counterfeit product and equipment on
the premises.106 Then, the AMR will destroy the seized materials or
sell them in a public auction with any infringing trademarks first
removed from the products.107 The ease with which brand owners can
obtain raids through AMRs is one reason why using the AMRs
remains popular.108
b. Lack of Deterrence
Although enforcement through the AMRs remains a popular
option for brand owners, this approach contains significant
deficiencies, as illustrated by the enforcement statistics below.
AMR-AIC Trademark Enforcement Activity, 1999–2017109

Year

Cases

Average
Fine

Average
Damages

Criminal
Prosecutions

1999

16,938

$754

$40

2000

22,001

$794

$19

21 total
(1 in 806 cases)
45 total
(1 in 489 cases)

103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
See id. at 771–72.
106.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 60.
107.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishi Chanquan Haiguan Baohu Tiaoli (中华人民共
和国知识产权海关保护条例) [Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by the Order of the State Council, Mar. 24,
2010, effective April 1, 2010) art. 27, 2010 China Law LEXIS 2985.
108.
See Danny Chen, How to Run an Administrative Raid in China, WORLD TRADEMARK
REV. (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/how-run-administrative-raid-china
[https://perma.cc/BTB7-VW89] (explaining that “administrative raids are a popular anticounterfeiting tool”).
109.
This table was compiled using the STATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & COM., CHINA, ANNUAL
DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CHINA’S TRADEMARK STRATEGY 2013–2017. Prior to 2018, the State
Administration of Market Regulation was known as the State Administration of Industry and
Commerce (SAIC). See id. These statistics above track AIC enforcement activity. Id.
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2001

22,813

$1150

$18

2002

23,539

$1136

$19

2003

26,488

$1142

$51

2004

40,171

$834

$26

2005

49,412

$1017

$40

2006

50,534

$1158

$53

2007

50,318

$1220

N/A

2008

56,634

$1212

N/A

2009

51,044

$1117

N/A

2010

56,034

$1164

N/A

2011

79,021

$1119

N/A

2012

66,227

$1206

N/A

2013

56,876

$711

N/A

2014

55,202

$2610

N/A

2015

30,716

$1725

N/A

2016

31,754

$1273

N/A

2017

30,130

$2413

N/A
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86 total
(1 in 265 cases)
59 total
(1 in 265 cases)
45 total
(1 in 399 cases)
96 total
(1 in 418 cases)
91 total
(1 in 209 cases)
252 total
(1 in 200 cases)
229 total
(1 in 209 cases)
137 total
(1 in 413 cases)
92 total
(1 in 555 cases)
175 total
(1 in 320 cases)
421 total
(1 in 188 cases)
576 total
(1 in 115 cases)
477 total
(1 in 119 cases)
355 total
(1 in 155 cases)
238 total
(1 in 129 cases)
293 cases
(1 in 108 cases)
240 cases
(1 in 125 cases)

The statistics above track AMR-AIC enforcement activity
beginning in 1999 to 2017, the most recent year for which data is
available.110 The beginning of this period is significant because
counterfeiting began to gain international attention as a major

110.

Id.
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problem for MNCs in China.111 As a result, the number of AMR-AIC
enforcement cases rose rapidly from about seventeen thousand cases
in 1999 to a peak of almost eighty thousand cases in 2011 and settling
to above thirty thousand cases in 2017.112 While the number of cases
increased dramatically during this period, remedial measures in the
form of compensation and fines remain at a level that is too low to
create deterrence.113 In 2017, fines for counterfeiting averaged $2,413,
while for most of the decade, fines typically were under $2,000, and
only $711 in 2013 when nearly fifty-seven thousand AMR-AIC
enforcement actions were brought.114 Fines at these levels are so low
that they are commonly considered just the “cost of doing business” by
counterfeiters.115 Historically, compensatory damages have also been
trivially low, although no statistics on compensatory damages have
been available for over a decade.116 In sum, such low monetary
penalties against counterfeiters do not create deterrence.
Under PRC law, AMRs are required to transfer cases to the
PSB for criminal investigation when the AMRs discover evidence of
criminal activity in the course of their enforcement actions.117 In 2017,
only 1 in 125 cases (240 cases of 30,130) were transferred to the
PSB.118 The recent trend indicates that more cases are being
transferred to the PSB than in the earlier years of this period, but the
number of cases (less than 1 percent) in recent years shows that
enforcement actions of the AMRs that result in criminal investigations
are rare.119 The unlikely prospect of criminal enforcement in cases
initiated by AMRs is another reason why MNCs believe that AMR
enforcement does not create effective deterrence.120
One reason why AMRs transfer so few cases to the PSB has to
do with institutional competitiveness and internal bureaucratic

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 9.
See STATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & COM., supra note 109.
See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 33.
See STATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & COM., supra note 109.
See Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 8, at 757; KRISTINA
SEPETYS & ALAN COX, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CHINA:
TRENDS
IN
LITIGATION
AND
ECONOMIC
DAMAGES
4
&
n.15
(2009),
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_0109
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV8Q-LPNX].
116.
See Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 8, at 757. See SEPETYS & COX, supra
note 115.
117.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 61.
118.
See STATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & COM., supra note 109.
119.
SEPETYS & COX, supra note 115, at 5–6.
120.
See id. at 5.
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rivalries.121 If the AMR transfers the case to the PSB, the AMR must
also transfer all seized products and any cash and equipment.122 The
AMR has less to report on to its supervisory organ and loses the
opportunity to sell the seized materials and earn revenue.123 AMRs
will have expended time and resources in conducting the raid but have
nothing to show for these efforts when a case is transferred to the
PSB.124 This possibility leads to a reluctance by AMRs to transfer
cases to the PSB.125
These statistics indicate that while AMR enforcement remains
a popular option, such enforcement does not deter future illegal
conduct due to the lack of meaningful repercussions for the
counterfeiter.126 Moreover, each enforcement action can cost brand
owners thousands of dollars in fees for private investigation
companies and law firms.127 For enforcement actions to have any effect
on counterfeiters, the brand owner must continuously bring these
actions, or else the brand owner will gain a reputation that it does not
actively enforce its rights. The mounting costs of numerous
enforcement actions and their lack of deterrence are a source of
significant frustration for many brand owners. Some brand owners
believe that AMR enforcement actions are futile and a waste of
resources; these actions only antagonize and anger counterfeiters, who
are able to shortly resume their illegal activities.128
2. Courts and Civil Litigation
Brand owners have the option of pursuing civil litigation in
courts instead of following the route of administrative action through
AMRs.129 Most brand owners find, however, that court-based litigation
is useful only in cases involving lawful business entities with a
legitimate business dispute relating to trademarks.130 For example, if
two lawfully registered companies have a dispute concerning a
registered trademark, the companies may wish to litigate their claims
121.
See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing bureaucratic competition
in China).
122.
Id. at 24–25 (describing several other administrations with similar functions
transferring confiscated goods to PSB).
123.
Id. at 32.
124.
Id.
125.
Id. at 33.
126.
Id.
127.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24.
128.
See id. at 12.
129.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 60.
130.
See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 47.
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in court instead of having the SAMR resolve the dispute through the
less formal administrative process. In the case of counterfeit goods,
the counterfeiter will abscond at the first sign of trouble.131 In many
cases, the counterfeiter is also an illegal, underground operator using
a false name and identity and may be engaged in other petty criminal
activities.132 Even if the counterfeiter can be located and served with
legal process, the counterfeiter flees immediately and never arrives in
court.133 For this reason, most brand owners avoid using courts
because they do not provide an effective means to resolve
counterfeiting cases.
3. The Public Security Bureau
The deficiencies of administrative and judicial enforcement
have led many brand owners to pursue criminal enforcement.134 Most
brand owners believe that criminal punishment, including
imprisonment, is the most effective deterrent against any type of
criminal activity, including counterfeiting.135
All criminal investigations in China must be initiated by local
PSBs, which are under the control of the Ministry of Public Security,
the central-level authority in charge of suppressing crime and
preserving social order.136 The PSB is the primary police force in
China charged with maintaining social safety and stability.137 To
maintain stability and order, the PSB focuses on suppressing violent
crimes, such as homicide, rape, robbery, and assault.138 The PSB also
focuses on stopping domestic terrorism, political dissent, and criticism
of the Communist Party.139 Both violent crime and political dissent are
viewed as directly threatening social stability, and their prevention
and suppression are considered to be core duties of the PSB.140
131.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 4; Alibaba, Amazon, and
Counterfeiting, supra note 4, at 163.
132.
See Elizabeth Schulze, Counterfeit Goods from China Are Crushing American
Small Businesses – and They’re Calling on Trump to Fight Back, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/small-businesses-are-pushing-trump-to-fight-chinesecounterfeits.html [https://perma.cc/CVM6-DW8X] (Mar. 1, 2020, 11:04 PM).
133.
See id.; Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 3.
134.
Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 4.
135.
See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 33.
136.
Ministry
of
Public
Security,
STATE
COUNCIL
OF
CHINA,
http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/content_281474986284154.htm
[https://perma.cc/QX6N-RJU5] (Aug. 25, 2014, 4:04 PM).
137.
Id.
138.
See id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
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Despite the key role of the PSB, limits on its current funding
levels adversely impact its institutional capacity and ability to do
on-the-ground criminal enforcement.141 Funding limits and shortages
of manpower are chronic problems for the PSB, making performance
of its work difficult and forcing the PSB to prioritize the type of cases
that it will investigate.142 Economic crimes, such as counterfeiting, are
not viewed as priorities; the PSB will actively pursue such cases only
in certain special situations involving victims who have been harmed
or killed.143 For example, the PSB will actively pursue cases involving
counterfeit liquor, which has caused deaths by alcohol poisoning;
counterfeit pharmaceuticals, which have caused persons to become
sick or die; or counterfeit money, which is viewed as a direct threat to
the State.144 Victimless counterfeiting cases, such as those involving
purely economic harm that does not cause injury or death to
consumers, are not considered priorities by the PSB.145
The PSBs have the authority to bring a criminal action in
counterfeiting cases pursuant to Article 140 of the PRC Criminal
Law.146 In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001,
among other changes, China enacted Article 140 to satisfy the WTO
requirement that it must have criminal penalties for counterfeiting on
a commercial scale.147 Similar to many other PRC criminal statutes,
Article 140 uses a monetary threshold test, with the level of criminal
liability increasing based on the value of sales of counterfeit goods.148
141.
Suzanne E. Scoggins, Policing Modern China, 3 CHINA L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 82 (2018).
142.
Id.
143.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 9–10.
144.
See, e.g., 13 Jailed for Making Fake Moutai Liquor in SW China, XINHUANET (Dec.
28,
2020,
6:51
PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/28/c_139624357.htm
[https://perma.cc/858Z-QKEB] (reporting that Chinese police arrested suspects with twentyseven thousand bottles of fake liquor); Chinese Police Seize 422-mln-Yuan Counterfeit Money,
XINHUANET
(May
15,
2020,
12:26
AM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202005/15/c_139057549.htm [https://perma.cc/SK9W-T5Y7] (“Police from Heilongjiang and Guangdong provinces captured 16 suspects and seized equipment and raw materials for money counterfeiting in a joint operation.”); China Arrests 1,900 in Crackdown on Fake Drugs, BBC NEWS (Aug.
6, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19144556 [https://perma.cc/AF7B-496T]
(“Police in China have arrested more than 1,900 people in a crackdown on the manufacture and
sale of fake medicine.”).
145.
Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 7.
146.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 140.
147.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 61, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
148.
PRC Criminal Law, supra note 5, art. 140
(Any producer or seller who mixes impurities into or adulterates the products, or
passes a fake product off as a genuine one, a defective product as a high-quality one,
or a substandard product as a standard one, if the amount of earnings from sales is
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For example, if sales of counterfeits are between 50,000 Renminbi
(“people’s currency” or RMB) and 200,000 RMB (about USD $7,720 to
$31,000), the suspect faces two years of imprisonment.149 For sales
between 200,000 to 500,000 RMB (about $31,000 to $77,000), the
suspect faces imprisonment of between two to seven years.150 The
maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment is imposed in cases
where sales exceed 2 million RMB.151
The procedure for initiating a case with the PSB is similar to
that used in administrative enforcement cases.152 The brand owner
must present a copy of its trademark certificate and be prepared with
information about the identity and location of the counterfeiter.153 The
PSB will then initiate a raid and seize counterfeit products,
equipment, and cash.154 As in the case of PRC administrative
authorities, the PSB does not have the resources or the interest to
investigate counterfeiting cases to independently locate the
counterfeiter or determine the number of completed sales and whether
various thresholds have been met.155 Instead, the brand owner
provides this evidence to the PSB.156 In most cases, the brand owner
will need to hire a private investigation company to assist in making
these determinations.157

more than 50,000 yuan but less than 200,000 yuan, shall be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than two years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall
only, be fined not less than half but not more than two times the amount of earnings
from sales; if the amount of earnings from sales is more than 200,000 yuan but less
than 500,000 yuan, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than
two years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined not less than half but
not more than two times the amount of earnings from sales; if the amount of earnings
from sales is more than 500,000 yuan but less than 2,000,000 yuan, he shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than seven years and shall also be
fined not less than half but not more than two times the amount of earnings from
sales; if the amount of earnings from sales is more than 2,000,000 yuan, he shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 15 years or life imprisonment, and shall also
be fined not less than half but not more than two times the amount of earnings from
sales or be sentenced to confiscation of property.).
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 3.
153.
Chen, supra note 108.
154.
Id.
155.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 9–10.
156.
See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 23.
157.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24.
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a. PSB’s Reputation
The PSB is one of the most powerful entities in the PRC and is
also one of the most feared.158 Most people in China are terrified of the
PSB and will do everything possible to avoid any interaction with it.159
The PSB is notorious in China for using torture to obtain coerced
confessions, most often in cases involving political dissent or in serious
criminal cases like homicide.160 In some instances, the use of torture in
obtaining confessions results in the suspect’s death, including the
recent case of a twenty-eight-year-old man who was dead less than
two hours after being detained.161 Other suspects in custody simply
disappear and are never heard from again.162 The PSB is also known
to beat up, abuse, and torture suspects.163 The PSB is almost
universally viewed as corrupt by the public in China.164

158.
Scoggins, supra note 141, at 80.
159.
See, e.g., Paul Mozur & Aaron Krolik, A Surveillance Net Blankets China’s
Cities,
Giving
Police
Vast
Powers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/technology/china-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/JN43MHXT]. This observation is based on the author’s own experience living in China and based on
discussion with Chinese academics and lawyers.
160.
CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 116TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT 92 (2020),
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/2020%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20
FINAL%201223.pdf [https://perma.cc/23SZ-4496].
161.
Yuning Wu & Ivan Sun, Chinese Police Legitimacy and Public Trust, ASIA DIALOGUE
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/02/16/chinese-police-legitimacy-and-publictrust/ [https://perma.cc/9EJW-LCLA] (reporting that in 2018, Lei Yang, a twenty-eight-year-old
state employee, was declared dead less than two hours after being detained by the police, allegedly on suspicion of soliciting a prostitute).
162.
Stanley Lubman, Arrested, Detained: A Guide to Navigating China’s Police Powers,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2014, 3:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-23571
[https://perma.cc/TN7V-55K4] (discussing human rights activists who “disappeared” after being
taken into police custody).
163.
E.g., SAFEGUARD DEFS., CHINA AID, CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY WORLDWIDE,
FRONT LINE DEFS., HUM. RTS. WATCH, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS & WORLD ORG. AGAINST
TORTURE, SUBMISSION TO SELECT UN SPECIAL PROCEDURES ON: CHINA’S PRACTICE OF
EXTRACTING AND BROADCASTING FORCED CONFESSIONS BEFORE TRIAL 3 (2020),
https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Submission%20to%20select%20UN%20Spe
cial%20Procedures%20%20China’s%20practice%20of%20extracting%20and%20broadcasting%20
forced%20confessions%20before%20trial%20Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEX5-YQPQ] (“The
televised confessions are now well and truly normalized in China. They are systematically linked
to other abuses such as torture, threats, forced medication, arbitrary detention and prolonged
solitary confinement during investigation phase.”); see Beijing PSB: Few Criminal Suspects
Meet with Lawyers During the First Stages of Detention, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA (July 1,
2015), https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/beijing-psb-few-criminal-suspectsmeet-with-lawyers-during-the [https://perma.cc/VL5X-2M7R].
164.
Scoggins, supra note 141, at 23.
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b. The Ability of PSB to Detain Without Arrest and Without Charging
The PSB has earned a notorious reputation among the public
in China partly because of its ability to hold suspects in custody for
long periods of time even though the suspect is never charged with a
crime.165 PRC law draws a basic distinction between detention and
arrest. Under the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the PSB has broad
discretion to detain persons suspected of criminal activity.166 For
example, the PSB can detain a suspect “if he is preparing to commit a
crime,” and it is up to the PSB alone to decide whether this condition
has been met.167 Such decisions by the PSB are not subject to review
by courts or oversight by any higher authorities.168
Under the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, once the PSB detains
a suspect, the PSB has three days to apply to the Procuratorate,169
the supervisory authority that also acts as the prosecutor for an arrest
warrant.170 The period can be extended for another one to four days, or
even thirty days in the case of a suspect who is involved in committing
crimes in multiple locations or as part of a gang.171 If the PSB decides
to wait thirty days, there is no process to review its decision.172 The
Procuratorate is required to reach a decision on whether to approve an
arrest within seven days from the date of the request by the PSB.173
Unless the Procuratorate approves the arrest, the detainee must be
immediately released.174 These provisions allow for the PSB to detain
a suspect for nearly a month and a half before the Procuratorate
denies a request for an arrest warrant, leading to the detainee’s
release.175
A person detained by the PSB may be exposed to brutal
conditions. Detainees are held in detention centers, not prisons.176
165.
Lubman, supra note 162 (noting that the police have many extralegal means to detain persons).
166.
PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 12, art. 80.
167.
Id.
168.
See id. art. 83. The PSB must prepare a detention warrant, but there is no process
for review of the warrant by a court or a higher-level authority. See id.
169.
Id. art. 91. The Procuratorate has powers other than as a prosecutor. The
Procuratorate also supervises the other judicial organs, including the courts.
People’s Procuratorates, CHINA.ORG, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/Brief/192298.htm
[https://perma.cc/B2YV-8QD6] (last visited Jan. 28, 2022).
170.
PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 12, art. 89.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
See id.
176.
Id. art. 91.
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These centers are known to be harsh, degrading, and repulsive.177
Conditions are unsanitary, and diets are ascetic and inadequate.178
Once a suspect is arrested, they are subject to long periods of
custodial detention without being charged with a crime. Unlike the US
legal system, which requires probable cause for an arrest,179 the
Criminal Procedure Law allows a suspect to be arrested upon
suspicion of having committed a crime with an investigation to
proceed afterward to find evidence of a crime.180 In accordance with
the Criminal Procedure Law, the PSB will continue to investigate the
case post-arrest for evidence of criminal guilt.181
If the Procuratorate issues an arrest warrant, the PSB can
continue to hold the suspect in custody for up to two months, during
which the PSB is to continue its investigation of the crime.182 If the
PSB finds the crime to be complex, the investigation period can be
extended for an additional month upon approval by higher-level
authorities.183 The PSB can add another two months of investigation
in certain cases deemed “grave,” upon approval by higher-level
authorities.184 The PSB can add yet another two-month extension for
crimes punishable by imprisonment of at least ten years if the PSB is
unable to conclude its investigation.185 Under these provisions, the
total period of investigation can total seven months.186 Added to the
month and a half of pre-arrest detention, the total period during which
a suspect can be held without being charged with a crime can be up to
eight and a half months.187 Finally, if additional crimes are discovered
during the investigation, then these periods are to be recalculated

177.
See, e.g., Former Salesman Repeatedly Persecuted for His Faith over the Past
22
Years
(Part
1),
MINGHUI.ORG
(Nov.
16,
2021),
https://en.minghui.org/html/articles/2021/11/16/196605.html [https://perma.cc/UW2A-QQKE]; Li
Enshen, Prisonization or Socialization? Social Factors Associated with Chinese Administrative
Offenses, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 213, 244 (2010) (detainees accused of all different types of
crimes, from the pettiest to crimes of violence, are commingled in a single room where they must
remain at all times, including at night when they sleep); Xu Zhiyong, The Plight of a Young
Chinese Volunteer, CHINA CHANGE (July 12, 2012), https://chinachange.org/2012/07/23/the-plightof-a-young-chinese-volunteer-by-xu-zhiyong/comment-page-1/ [https://perma.cc/GNQ8-Z7KX].
178.
Xu, supra note 177.
179.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
180.
PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 12, art. 82.
181.
Id. art. 115.
182.
Id. art. 156.
183.
Id. art. 156.
184.
Id. art. 158.
185.
Id. art. 159.
186.
Id. art. 156, 158–59.
187.
Id. art. 91.

658

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:633

from the beginning.188 Although any additional periods beyond the
first two months of post-arrest investigation require higher-level
approvals, PSBs are known to continue the investigation without
obtaining the needed approvals.189
Most people in China are generally aware of the coercive
powers of the PSB to subject persons to long periods of detention and
police custody even though they are ultimately never charged with a
crime.190 The public in China is also generally aware that suspects are
held under harsh and vile conditions and that the PSB can be abusive
to suspects.191
Given the PSB’s reputation, brand owners believe that criminal
prosecution through the PSBs is the most effective deterrent against
counterfeiting.192 For these reasons, many brand owners seek to use
the PSB, when possible, in counterfeiting investigations.
c. Case Fees
A major problem that results from using the PSBs is their
demand for payments of “case fees.” Brand owners who approach the
PSB for a criminal investigation of counterfeiting usually find that the
PSB will claim that, due to its limited funds and manpower, it cannot
initiate an investigation into counterfeiting activities that do not
result in harm to or death of consumers.193 PSBs will inform the brand
owner, however, that if it pays a “case fee,” then the PSB will bring a
case because it will use the fee to defray the expenses of the
investigation and will not need to tap its own resources.194
Although the use of case fees is well known in circles among IP
lawyers and private investigation companies in China, many MNCs
are unaware of this practice.195 Case fees are a controversial and
sensitive topic due to their dubious legality. There is nothing written
about case fees in any official publication or in the secondary
literature on IP legal practices in China. Nevertheless, payments of
188.
Id. art. 160.
189.
See Expert Report of Daniel C.K. Chow at ¶¶ 99–100, Styller v. Hewlett Packard
Fin. Servs., No. 1:16-CV-10386 (D. Mass. dismissed Dec. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Chow Expert
Report].
190.
See Mozur & Krolik, supra note 159 (“China’s police . . . enjoy broad powers to
question and detain people.”). This observation is also supported by the author’s discussions with
persons in China, including academics and lawyers.
191.
See Mozur & Krolik, supra note 159; SAFEGUARD DEFS. ET AL., supra note 163.
192.
Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 33.
193.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 9–10.
194.
Id. at 11.
195.
Id. at 8.
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case fees have become so common that there is now a known schedule
of case fees that brand owners can be expected to pay.196
d. Risks Created by Paying Case Fees
Although the practice of paying case fees to the PSB is now
commonplace,197 MNCs are exposed to several significant risks created
by this practice. The risks involved in making payments to the PSB,
including the significant FCPA risks discussed in Part III,198 make
this practice considerably more dangerous than using AMRs, even
with all of their limitations.
First, although many lawyers in China argue that case fees fall
into a gray area of the law, case fees could fall within provisions of the
PRC Criminal Law proscribing bribery.199 For example, Article 389 of
the Criminal Law provides in relevant part: “Whoever, for the purpose
of securing illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to a State
functionary shall be guilty of offering bribes.”200 At present, no one
openly discusses case fees, and no court in China has ruled on
whether case fees constitute bribes; however, the possibility
remains that a court or other authority, such as the Procuratorate,
will issue a ruling that case fees are illegal. The PSB and the
Procuratorate could also decide to launch an investigation into this
practice. Such developments could subject MNCs, as well as their
officers and representatives, to embarrassment and criminal
liability.
Second, while the practice of paying case fees may advance an
MNC’s interests in the short term, it could harm MNCs in the longer
term. Some MNCs might see better results in protecting their brands
in the short run, but this practice further increases and entrenches
corruption in the PRC legal and political system. PSBs are already
known as notoriously corrupt, and many other parts of China’s legal
apparatus suffer from the same complaint by MNCs.201 Perpetuating
corruption is damaging to the long-term interests of MNCs because a
corrupt business environment creates unpredictability and adds many

196.
See Counterfeiting in China, supra note 1, at 30–31.
197.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 7.
198.
See infra Part III; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
199.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 3; PRC Criminal Procedure Law,
supra note 12, art. 389.
200.
PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 12, art. 389.
201.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 13–14; Daniel C.K. Chow, How
China’s Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transparency in the Enforcement of China’s
Anti-Bribery Laws, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 685, 698–700 (2015).
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additional costs to doing business in China. These costs will harm the
business prospects of MNCs in the long term. Perpetuating corruption
is also harmful to the long-term interests of China, as it undermines
improvements and progress in China’s legal system.202
Third, case fees can easily become a trap for the MNC. Once
the MNC pays a case fee to initiate the filing of a case, the PSB is
known to ask for additional payments.203 The PSB could claim that
mounting expenses require new payments or that the continuation of
the investigation beyond the initial stages requires additional
payments.204 If the PSB detains suspects for extended periods, the
PSB might ask for continuing payments to defray the cost of
detention.205 If the MNC refuses to make the payments, the PSB will
threaten to immediately terminate the investigation.206 The MNC
then finds itself trapped and pressured into making continuing
payments to the PSB.207 As a result, the MNC finds itself involved in a
prolonged and unseemly entanglement with the PSB.208
The risks associated with the payment of case fees discussed
above and those under the FCPA examined in Part III below,209
indicate that MNCs must prevent the payment of these fees. Having
the MNC register the trademark in its own name and then license the
trademark to its China subsidiaries will give the MNC the greatest
amount of control necessary to prevent the payment of these fees. The
registered trademark owner is the entity that must file a petition with
the PRC enforcement authorities, either the AMR or the PSB.210
Chinese enforcement authorities will insist on seeing a copy of the
trademark registration certificate to verify that the petitioner has the
right to enforce the trademark.211 As the trademark owner, the MNC

202.
See Chow, supra note 201, at 700–01.
203.
This observation is based on the author’s own experience in hiring private
investigation companies in China and in working with PSBs and administrative
authorities in China. See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 9.
204.
See Cultural Barriers, supra note 87, at 555–56.
205.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 6, 9; PRC Criminal Procedure Law,
supra note 12, arts. 82, 156, 158–59. In a different context, the enforcement of trade secrets,
PSBs are also known to ask additional and continuing payments, leaving the MNC trapped in an
ongoing entanglement with the PSB. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade
Secrets Protection in China, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 1036 (2014).
206.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 11.
207.
Id. at 2–3.
208.
Id.
209.
See infra Part III; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
210.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 3, 67.
211.
Id. arts. 60–61.
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will send its representatives to appear before the PSB.212 The MNC is
in a position to control the actions of its representatives and can firmly
and directly instruct them not to pay case fees. If the MNC has hired a
private investigation company, the MNC can also instruct the private
investigators not to withhold payment. If the PSB will not act without
a case fee, then the alternative is for the MNC to bring an
enforcement action before the AMR, which do not insist on case fees.
As noted earlier, the use of AMR does not create significant
deterrence,213 so this alternative is not ideal; but it may be the best
option under China’s current enforcement system given the risks
associated with the payment of case fees.
A different legal situation exists if the US-based parent MNC is
not the registered owner of the trademark in China. As discussed
earlier, some MNCs will allow their Chinese business entities to be
the registered trademark owner, as this approach is less complicated
and involves lower costs.214 If the Chinese business entity is the
registered trademark owner, then this entity, not the MNC, must file
the petition with the PRC enforcement authorities.215 If, instead, the
MNC attempts to file the petition, the PRC enforcement authorities
will reject it on the grounds that the MNC has no legal standing to
assert trademark rights.216 Even if the MNC is the US parent of a
wholly owned Chinese business entity, it is the Chinese entity, not the
MNC, that is the registered owner of the trademark.217 The Chinese
business entity is a discrete legal entity under PRC law,218 and the
corporate structure of the MNC and its subsidiaries are not relevant
to the PRC authorities.219
In situations where the Chinese business entity is the
registered trademark owner, the business entity might pay case fees
to the PSBs without informing the US parent.220 Many Chinese
business entities believe that they must conduct themselves in
accordance with the general business culture that is widely accepted
212.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 7.
213.
See Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 8, at 757; SEPETYS & COX, supra note
115, at 2.
214.
See supra Section II.A.; PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 3, 43, 60; and PRC
Foreign Investment Law, supra note 17, art. 2.
215.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 3, 43, 60.
216.
Id.
217.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 3, 43.
218.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Shang Biao Fa (中华人民共和国公司法)
[Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 10, 2018, effective October 10, 2018) art. 3, 2018 China Law LEXIS 1597.
219.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 3.
220.
See infra Part II; Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 9.
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in China. Part of this business culture involves the use of petty bribes
in conducting business on a daily basis.221 This practice is widespread
and tolerated in China and long predates the current Communist
regime.222 The Chinese business entity might deliberately avoid
informing the US parent that it is paying case fees because it believes
that the US parent might lack an understanding of the prevailing
business culture and object.223 Because it is an independent legal
entity, the Chinese business entity might believe that it does not have
to inform the parent of these practices.224 Where the business entity
pays case fees, it indirectly involves the US parent in the
entanglement with the PSB with all of its attendant risks discussed
above.225
Aside from issues rising under PRC law and politics, another
even more significant threat to MNCs lies in US statutes, such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,226 and other foreign laws that could
capture the case fee as an illegal payment.227 These risks are so
significant that they must be examined in detail in the next Part of
this Article.
III. ISSUES UNDER THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT
Aside from the considerations already discussed, the payment
of case fees to the PSB could also raise issues for the MNC under the
United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other anti-bribery
laws.228 As many MNCs with headquarters in the United States also
have operations in multiple countries, they may be subject not only to
the FCPA but also to similar legislation in foreign countries, such as
the United Kingdom Bribery Act,229 which has been viewed as having
an even broader application than the FCPA.230 The discussion below
221.
See Cultural Barriers, supra note 87, at 552.
222.
Daniel C.K. Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
573, 575 (2012).
223.
Chow Expert Report, supra note 189, at ¶¶ 78–81.
224.
Id.
225.
See, e.g., Alexion Pharm., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 89214, 2020 WL 3630000
at 2, 7 (July 2, 2020) (holding a US company responsible for failing to monitor the actions of its
foreign subsidiaries to detect misconduct).
226.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
227.
See, e.g., Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
228.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
229.
Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
230.
See Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
New UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability in the Prevention of For-
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focuses on the FCPA, but it is important to emphasize that other
national legislation targeting foreign bribery might also be applicable
to US-based MNCs in place of or together with the FCPA.
The FCPA contains three sets of provisions: (1) the anti-bribery
provisions that apply to all persons or entities; (2) the books and
records; and (3) internal controls provisions that apply only to issuers
of securities on a public exchange and registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.231 The United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) enforces the anti-bribery provisions in criminal cases,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces the antibribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions against
issuers in administrative cases.232 Publicly traded companies are
subject to the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls
provisions,233 while companies without securities traded on a public
exchange are subject only to the anti-bribery provisions.234 The antibribery provisions are contained in section 30A of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act); the books and records
provisions and the internal controls provisions are contained in
sections 13(b)(2)(A) and (B) respectively.235 As many US-based MNCs
are publicly traded companies, they would be subject to all three sets
of FCPA provisions.236
These provisions of the FCPA create separate, discrete sets of
obligations and liabilities. A violation of any one provision—for
example, the internal accounting controls—gives rise to liability
regardless of whether the anti-bribery or books and records provisions
have also been violated.237
The SEC has stated that “[p]ublic companies are responsible
for ensuring that their foreign subsidiaries comply with [s]ections
13(b)(2)(A) and (B) [books and records and internal controls], and 30A
of the Exchange Act [anti-bribery provisions].”238
eign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 845, 866 (2011); Sharifa G. Hunter, A Comparative Analysis of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, and the Practical Implications of
Both on International Business, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 89, 92 (2011).
231.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B).
232.
CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., & ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3–4 (2020),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZN5-HZ8E].
233.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B).
234.
Id. § 78dd-2.
235.
Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78(m)(b)(2)(A)–(B).
236.
Id.
237.
Id.
238.
Diagnostic Prods. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51724, 2005 WL 1211548 at 3
(May 20, 2005).
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A. The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, contained in Section
30A of the Exchange Act, prohibit public companies from making
improper payments to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing
their decisions in order to obtain or retain business.239 In the Matter of
Diagnostic Products Corporation involved Diagnostic Products
Corporation (DPC),240 a California company based in Los Angeles,
which manufactured medical diagnostic test systems and test kits.241
DPC’s wholly owned subsidiary, DePu Biotechnological & Medical
Products Inc. (DePu), was based in Tianjin, China.242 From 1991 to
2002, DePu made payments to doctors and laboratory employees who
controlled purchasing decisions.243 DPC was unaware of these
payments until 2002.244 DPC then instructed DePu to discontinue
these payments in January 2003.245 Under these facts, the SEC found
that “DPC violated Section 30A of the Exchange Act, which prohibits
making improper payments to foreign officials for the purpose of
influencing their decisions in order to obtain or retain business.”246
DPC was found liable under the FCPA for payments made without its
knowledge by its wholly owned Chinese subsidiary.247
Under the FCPA, a payment is unlawful if made for the
purpose of “obtaining or retaining business,” also known as the
business nexus test.248 In United States v. Kay, the US Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a narrow reading of the business
nexus test as limited to obtaining or retaining government
239.
15 U.S.C §78dd-1
(It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant
to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under section 78o(d) of
this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any, to make
use of the mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in
furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of any of value
to— (1) any foreign official for purposes of— (A)(i) influencing any act or decision of
such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or
omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official . . . (B) . . . in order to
assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business.).
240.
Diagnostic Prods. Corp., supra note 238.
241.
Id. at 1.
242.
Id.
243.
Id. at 2.
244.
Id.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
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contracts.249 The defendants in Kay paid bribes to Haitian authorities
to understate customs duties and sales tax on rice shipped to Haiti by
American Rice, Inc., the defendants’ employer.250 Defendants argued
that such payments were not violations of the FCPA because they
were payments to reduce costs and were not for the purpose of
obtaining a new government contract or renewing an existing one.251
Payments to reduce costs did not satisfy the FCPA business nexus
test, i.e., that the payments were for obtaining or retaining
business.252 The Fifth Circuit stated that the business nexus test
included payments made “to engender assistance in improving the
business opportunities of the payor . . . irrespective of whether it be
related to administering the law,” awarding, or renewing a contract.253
Thus, the SEC might view the PSB enforcement action in exchange for
the payment of case fees as a benefit “related to administering the
law” and as falling within the meaning of “retaining business.”254
Suppressing counterfeits allows a brand owner to protect and retain
its sales of authentic products.
These precedents suggest that if the Chinese subsidiary makes
a case fee payment to the PSB, the payment might also be captured
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. In any event, the SEC
might believe that a further investigation is warranted into the nature
and type of payments made for the purpose of obtaining police
protection of a business otherwise not available without the payment.
Any investigation would be disruptive to a company’s business
because it places the company under severe pressure and will require
many hours of time by senior executives who must respond to
inquiries by the SEC.255

249.
359 F.3d 738, 748 (5th Cir. 2004).
250.
Id. at 740.
251.
Id. at 743.
252.
Id. at 759.
253.
Id. at 749.
254.
See id.
255.
See Steven R. Peikin, Co-Director, Enf’t Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Reflections
on the Past, Present, and Future of the SEC’s Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
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[https://perma.cc/D8HJ-ENCD] (“FCPA investigations are often the cases that take the longest to
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B. The Books and Records and Internal Controls Provisions
1. Books and Records
Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires issuers to
“make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the issuer.”256 This provision prevents companies from
falsely reporting or disguising illegal payments as innocuous
expenses.257 The SEC has repeatedly stated that for the purposes of
section 13(b)(2)(A), the books and records of the subsidiary are
consolidated with those of the issuer for financial reporting.258
In the Matter of Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. involved Alexion
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
in Boston.259 Alexion developed and sold drugs for patients with
life-threatening rare and ultra-rare diseases.260 Alexion had wholly
owned subsidiaries in Turkey, Russia, Brazil, and Columbia.261
Alexion’s Turkey and Russia subsidiaries made improper payments to
officials in those countries in exchange for favorable regulatory
treatment for Alexion’s drugs.262 The Alexion subsidiaries in Turkey
and Russia did not accurately record these payments but maintained
false books and records.263 The SEC found “that these transactions
were not recorded accurately in the books and records of these
subsidiaries, which were consolidated into Alexion’s books and
records.”264 The SEC held Alexion, the US parent, liable for violating
the books and records provisions because its foreign subsidiaries made
inaccurate and false records of the payments.265 Under these
precedents, the records of a US-based MNC’s enforcement actions
256.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)
((2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of
this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d)
of this title shall—(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer.).
257.
Id.
258.
Alexion Pharm., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 89214, 2020 WL 3630000 at 3 (July
2, 2020) (noting that “Alexion Russia’s books and records were consolidated into Alexion’s
financial statements”).
259.
Id. at 2.
260.
Id.
261.
Id. at 3.
262.
Id. at 2.
263.
Id.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.
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against counterfeiting are consolidated to the records of its Chinese
business entity for the purposes of the books and records provisions of
the Exchange Act.266 If the Chinese business entity does not accurately
report its payments, the US-based parent could be deemed liable
under the books and records provision of the FCPA.267
2. Internal Accounting Controls
The SEC also found Alexion to be in violation of the internal
controls provisions.268 Although often discussed together with the
books and records provision, the internal controls provisions create a
separate and discrete obligation and serve as the basis for finding an
independent violation of the FCPA.269
Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires issuers to
“devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that [] (i) transactions are
executed in accordance with management’s authorization; (ii)
transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles . . . , and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii)
access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s . .
. authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets [periodically] and appropriate
action is taken with respect to any differences.”270
In Alexion Pharmaceuticals, the SEC found that Alexion, the
US parent, “failed to devise and maintain internal accounting controls
that were sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that payments
to HCPs [health care providers] in Russia were supported by adequate

266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269.
Id. at 7.
270.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)
((2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of
this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d)
of this title shall – (B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that – (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions ae
recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.).
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documentation and were for legitimate business purposes.”271 The
SEC also found that, because Alexion’s subsidiaries in Turkey, Brazil,
and Columbia maintained inaccurate records, Alexion was also in
violation of its duty to maintain internal accounting controls to
prevent the false reporting by those subsidiaries.272 In each case that
the SEC found the parent company to be in violation of the books and
records provision due to false reporting by a foreign subsidiary, the
SEC also found a violation of the internal controls provision by the
parent for failure to provide controls to preclude the false reporting by
a foreign subsidiary.273
Note that it is possible to violate the internal accounting
controls provision even if no bribe or other illegal payment was ever
made.274 The provision requires that the US parent ensures that a set
of internal accounting controls are put in place for its China-based and
other foreign subsidiaries. If no such controls are in place, this
omission alone is a violation.275 As noted earlier, some Chinese
business entities want the freedom to operate in China in accordance
with the prevailing business culture, which includes the use of petty
bribes on a frequent basis. Some of these local entities might want to
maintain a level of independence from the US parent in order to
conduct business and thus might resist the imposition of a set of
internal accounting controls.
IV. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
The deficiencies of administrative and judicial enforcement of
trademark rights against counterfeiting in China have led many
brand owners to choose criminal enforcement through the PSB as the
preferred remedial method. This Article has argued, however, that the
PSB’s demand for case fees in routine counterfeiting cases resulting
purely in economic harm creates significant risks for MNCs under
both PRC and US law. The discussion below contains suggestions on
how MNCs can best prevent or mitigate the risks outlined in this
Article.

271.
2, 2020).
272.
273.
274.
275.

Alexion Pharm., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 89214, 2020 WL 3630000 at 6 (July
Id. at 7.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
Id.
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A. The MNC as the Registered Trademark Owner in China
The US-based MNC should always serve as the registered
owner of all important trademarks in China. By serving as the entity
named as the owner on the trademark registration certificate, the
MNC now becomes the only entity legally entitled to use and enforce
trademark rights in China.276 The MNC can then license those
trademark rights to its Chinese business entity, required by PRC law
to be established as the vehicle through which the MNC does business
in China.277 The MNC can also impose conditions on the use of the
trademark in the licensing agreement with its Chinese subsidiaries.
These conditions can include an explicit prohibition of illegal
payments, such as case fees. The licensing agreement can also impose
a direct obligation to comply with the FCPA and other business ethics
rules. In the licensing agreement or a separate agreement, the MNC
can also appoint its Chinese subsidiary as its agent or representative
to assist the MNC in enforcing its trademark rights. Under this
arrangement, the MNC’s Chinese subsidiary will show the licensing
and agency agreements to PRC authorities, which will permit the
MNC’s Chinese subsidiary to enforce its trademark rights.278 As the
registered trademark owner, however, the MNC retains the ultimate
authority over the enforcement action, and its Chinese subsidiary
must take instructions from the MNC. While representatives of the
Chinese subsidiary will be tasked with the daily task of on-the-ground
enforcement, the MNC can intervene and terminate any investigation
with the PRC authorities at any time if concerns of improprieties
arise.
In some situations, the China business entity will need to use a
trademark that is owned by a local Chinese entity. This occurs, for
example, when the local partner in a joint venture has a valuable
trademark that the joint venture will need to use. In these
circumstances, the MNC should purchase the trademark from the
local partner, obtain a new registration certificate with the MNC
as the owner, and then license the trademark to the joint venture. The
MNC does not need to follow this approach for minor local
trademarks. Minor trademarks are those marks that have a low level
of sales and are not highly popular with consumers. These trademarks
are not likely to be counterfeited, as counterfeiters usually choose to
copy trademarks with high market value and that can be easily sold to
276.
277.
278.

PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, art. 60.
PRC Foreign Investment Law, supra note 17, art. 2.
PRC Trademark Law, supra note 5, arts. 43, 60.
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consumers. Any important trademarks in China, such as those with
substantial sales, should always be registered in the name of the
MNC.
Installing the MNC as the registered owner of the trademark
in China is the best method for avoiding and preventing the Chinese
subsidiary from making payments to the PSB or other PRC
authorities.279 If the MNC allows the Chinese subsidiary to be the
registered owner of the trademark, then the subsidiary, not the MNC,
is the only legal entity entitled to enforce trademark rights in China.
If the subsidiary makes payments to PRC authorities to obtain
criminal enforcement, the MNC might see a short-term gain, but such
gains will be outweighed in the long term by the risks and dangers
discussed in this Article.280 This suggested approach has the
disadvantage of involving more costs; it also has the drawback of
forgoing criminal enforcement by the PSBs if such enforcement cannot
be obtained without making an illegal payment. The suggested
approach, however, has the major benefit of ensuring that the actions
of the MNCs’ subsidiaries are always lawful and has the advantage of
mitigating the serious risks discussed in this Article.281
B. Guidelines and Transparency for Chinese Subsidiaries and
Independent Contractors
The MNC should insist that its China subsidiaries follow strict
guidelines prohibiting all payments to the PSB and other PRC
authorities except those required by PRC law, if any. These guidelines
should apply to the MNC’s China subsidiaries and third-party
independent contractors performing services for its Chinese
subsidiaries. These third parties include private investigation
companies and law firms.
Including third-party contractors in these guidelines is
important because these entities could pay fees on behalf of the
Chinese subsidiary. For example, a private investigation company or
law firm could pay fees to the PSBs or other PRC authorities and then
charge the fees disguised as other expenses to the Chinese
subsidiary.282 In these situations, the Chinese subsidiary may be
unaware that such fees were paid.283 The private investigation
279.
For example, the author has first-hand knowledge that Procter & Gamble, the US
parent company, always licensed its most important trademarks to its Chinese subsidiaries.
280.
Supra Section II.B.3.d.
281.
Supra Section II.B.3.d.
282.
See Payments to China’s Police, supra note 24, at 8.
283.
Id.
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company or law firm makes payments to PRC authorities and
achieves a good result for the brand owner.284 The third-party
contractor is then rewarded with professional success in the form of
higher fees, additional work, and a reputation for achieving results.285
MNCs should impose clear guidelines on these third-party contractors
prohibiting such payments.
The MNC should be wary if its Chinese subsidiary insists on
being able to operate independently to enforce trademark rights.286
Some Chinese subsidiaries take the position that they must be
allowed to operate in accordance with China’s indigenous business
culture, which includes the use of petty bribes as a routine part of
doing business and in dealing with PRC authorities.287 These
subsidiaries do not want to be hamstrung by restrictive policies of
their US parent company that they believe are not appropriate for
China’s business culture, and so insist on a high degree of
independence to conduct their own affairs.288 The MNC should never
agree to an arrangement with its Chinese subsidiary under which the
actions of the subsidiary might be shielded from its review, and the
subsidiary might engage in conduct of which the MNC is unaware.
This Article has discussed how such a hands-off approach entails high
risks.289
C. Compliance with the FCPA
US-based MNCs need to be on high alert with respect to FCPA
compliance issues involving their Chinese subsidiaries and IP
enforcement by their subsidiaries in China. To the extent that MNCs
have operations in other countries with legislation similar to the
FCPA, such as the United Kingdom,290 US-based MNCs need to also
be aware of the requirements of foreign anti-bribery laws.
The FCPA not only prohibits payments for the purpose of
“obtaining” business, but also for “retaining” business.291 This
two-pronged prohibition applies both to payments to obtain rewards of
new business contracts and also to actions that protect existing
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See Cultural Barriers, supra note 87, at 559–60.
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Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1).
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business activities.292 One interpretation of “retaining” business is
that enforcing IP rights allows the MNC to protect or retain profits
that would otherwise be lost to counterfeiters. The payment of case
fees to the PSB or other PRC authorities could be seen as a bribe to
obtain an enforcement action that would otherwise not be available to
the MNC in order to retain business.293
Aside from the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA, the books
and records and internal accounting controls provisions also create
serious concerns.294 MNCs must be aware that they may be in
violation of these provisions even if their Chinese subsidiaries never
complete or promise a bribe.295 The SEC has frequently admonished
US issuers of securities whose subsidiaries’ books and records are
consolidated with those of the US parent for the purpose of financial
reporting.296 The crux of this statement is that the US parent has a
duty to accurately report the financial transactions of its Chinese
subsidiaries, including any payments made to PRC authorities.297
The internal controls provision creates an additional duty on
the part of the MNC to establish a set of internal accounting controls
for its China subsidiaries sufficient to adequately record financial
transactions and ensure that the subsidiary accesses assets only in
accordance with the MNC’s general or specific instructions.298 The
absence of such controls, without more, constitutes a violation of the
FCPA.299
V. CONCLUSION
MNCs that rely upon their Chinese subsidiaries to bring
criminal enforcement actions against the counterfeiting of their
trademark rights may be exposed to risks of which they are unaware.
For a number of reasons explained above, the Chinese subsidiary may
make payments to the PSB without the knowledge of the MNC. The
purpose of this Article is to expose these risks and the conditions that
encourage and magnify them. While some of these risks arise purely
under the local laws of the PRC, other risks arise under the FCPA and
292.
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293.
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294.
Supra Section III.B.
295.
Supra Section III.B.
296.
See, e.g., Alexion Pharm., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 89214, 2020 WL 3630000
at 3 (July 2, 2020).
297.
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other foreign anti-bribery laws. The risks that such payments can
occur without the knowledge of the MNC are highest when its Chinese
subsidiary serves as the registered owner of the MNC’s trademarks in
China. MNCs that allow their subsidiaries to be the registered owner
of trademarks in China may be unaware of the risks to which this
practice will expose them. This Article has argued that the MNC
should always register all important trademarks in its own name and
license them to its Chinese subsidiaries. This approach is more
complicated and costly than simply allowing the Chinese subsidiary to
register the trademarks, but it also mitigates the risks created by the
latter approach. Careful advanced planning in accordance with the
suggestions set forth in this Article and continuing vigilance by
US-based MNCs can eliminate or mitigate many of the dangers
lurking in the criminal enforcement against counterfeiting in China.

